Abstract. The Air Force Research Laboratory's Satellite Threat Warning and Attack Reporting (STW/AR) program will provide technologies for advanced threat warning and reporting of radio frequency (RF) and laser threats. The STWIAR program objectives are:
(2) Demonstrate innovative, lightweight, low-power, RF and laser sensors.
The program focuses on the demonstration of RF and laser sensors. The RF sensor effort includes the investigation of interferometric antenna arrays, multi-arm spiral and butler matrix antennas, wideband receivers, adaptive processors, and improved processing algorithms. The laser sensor effort includes the investigation of alternative detectors, broadband grating and optical designs, active pixel sensing, and improved processing algorithms. An objective for both sensors is to miniaturize the sensor packages to reduce the weight and power requirements.
The most promising technologies will be demonstrated on two space experiments which will include the participation of Defense Department personnel involved with spacecraft operations. The ultimate goal is to deploy multiple STWIAR sensors as ride along payloads on high value spacecraft.
An RF space experiment will be flown on the Air Force Research Laboratory's MightySat I1 satellite in a low earth orbit around the year 2001. This light weight, low power, RF payload will monitor frequencies covering typical satellite communications. The sensor will have the capability to geo-locate RF sources of interest. Due to the short physical span of the RF interferometers, the geolocation algorithm will utilize satellite motion to resolve ambiguities.
The laser technology program will demonstrate various laser sensors on the ground with eventual demonstration in space. Linear arrays, to detect and geo-locate both continuous wave and pulsed laser sources, are being investigated. A visible and infrared subassembly is used to cover the required wavelengths while maintaining the needed sensitivity and false alarm rejection. In addition, algorithm development efforts are also underway to support the laser characterization and geo-location functions. The operational threats to a U. S. or Allied space system include natural and man-made radio frequency and optical interference. These threats may potentially damage or disrupt sensitive satellite subsystems andor payloads, causing interference to the space system's mission.
objective is to demonstrate light-weight, low-power, and cost-effective, radio-frequency and laser sensors. These objectives will be attained through two space experiments conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory. Figure 1 presents the history of threat warning and attack reporting programs. In 1986, the Air Force documented a need for autonomous satellite threat reporting capability for its space systems. This need launched a development program called the Satellite On-Board Attack Reporting System (SOARS).
BACKGROUND
SOARS was conceived as a demonstration program managed by the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), but later transferred to the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC).
The system performance requirements expanded beyond the original scope of the program. These developments eventually led to the opposition of several spacecraft System Program Offices (SPO) to SOARS due to its growing weight and power needs. The program was terminated in fiscal year 1992.
After the termination of SOARS, two concept studies, called the Miniature Attack Reporting System (MARS) and the Light-weight Attack Reporting System (LARS), were initiated. The MARS concept was initially intended for integration into the Brilliant Eyes system, but was later merged into the Miniaturized Satellite Attack Reporting System (MSTRS A STWIAR sensor package on board a host satellite will provide useful information in determining the cause of externally caused spacecraft anomalies, such as RF interference or laser jamming. Correlating the time of the anomaly with event reports from STW/AR may reveal the source of the anomaly. Currently, tracking down the cause of such anomalies often takes days of investigative effort. Reducing this time may pay for the cost of providing weight and power allocation for a STWIAR sensor.
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Cost of failure to detect threadimpact to host satellite Size dimension to minimize impact to host Table 1 . MOEs and MOPs to identify the type of threat. Depending upon on-board resources, signal processing can be done on the satellite or data relayed to the ground for processing. The finite size of a spacecraft restricts the size of the RF interferometer array, and the spatial resolution of laser sensors has a limit. Thus, a certain error circle on the location of a threat will result. In the RF case the error circle can be reduced by taking advantage of spacecraft motion to synthesize a larger array. For the MightySat experiment the RF resolution will be several hundred kilometers.
Once a STWIAR sensor detects and characterizes an event, the sensor must report its findings. Obviously, the STWIAR sensor must be robust enough to survive an event to do this. However, even a destroyed STWIAR sensor can provide simple but useful data if it fails to respond to periodic STWIAR may either use the host spacecraft's communications or an emergency communications system. 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The STWIAR system consists of sensors, data collection and processing hardware and software, communication hardware, and associated support systems. Depending upon how it is deployed some of these subsystems could be provided by the host spacecraft. In return for electrical power and weight allocation, and communications support, STWIAR will provide assistance with anomaly resolution.
Although the most common deployment option for is simplified and weight and power requirements are STWIAR is as a ride along payload, there are sewera1 minimized. The disadvantage is that satellite owners must alternatives. These options provide wide area coverage, or be willing to support a payload not dedicated to the primary specific spacecraft protection for high value assets. As mission.
On Host Satellite
Integrated Payload shown in Figure 3 , the deployment options are: strap-on payload, integrated payload, mini-satellite with hover., and constellation mode. STW/AR sensors deployed in a combination of options may provide a more robust warning network than a single option alone.
Strap-on Payload
The STW/AR sensor is deployed as an additional payload on a spacecraft but it is fully contained (non-distributed) and autonomous with its own power and communications subsystems. The host spacecraft provides only weighi[ and volume margin to accommodate STW/AR. In return, the satellite user receives information about threats or attacks. Event reports are sent by the STWIAR sensor directly to standard ground sites with no intervention by the host satellite. STW/AR communications links do not interfere with the host spacecraft's operations.
Integrated Payload
Miniature-Satellite in a Hover Mode
This deployment option calls for the STW/AR sensor to be deployed as a stand-alone, miniature satellite (mini-sat). STW/AR is launched at the same time as the host satellite and into the same orbit. Multiple mini-sats are deployed around high value satellites to provide a warning network. Using proximity detection, the STW/AR mini-satellites stay well clear of the monitored spacecraft while being close enough to the host spacecraft that any electromagnetic energy directed at the host will also impinge upon the STW/AR satellites.
The advantage of this deployment option is that the STWIAR sensor does not have to be integrated with the monitored spacecraft. STW/AR mini-satellites can be produced in large numbers and stockpiled for future launches. The mini-satellite is self-contained providing its own power, navigation, and communications.
In this option, the STW/AR sensor is an integral part of the payload. Power and communications are provided b y the host spacecraft. The advantage is that the STW/AR smsor
Miniature-Satellite in a Constellation
In this option, the STWIAR mini-sats are deployed into their own orbits and are not associated with any specific host satellite. Over a period of time, a network of S T W I A R satellites is deployed to act as a picket fence line. These mini-satellites would be deployed in large enough numbers to detect the diffracted RF energy at a satellite. Detection of laser energy would be extremely difficult due to the small beam diameter however; gross beam motion due to turbulence or tracking errors might allow detection. Ground processing would be required to correlate reports from one or more STWIAR satellites to determine the origin of the event. Although this deployment option will provide no direct indication of an event upon a specific satellite, status reports from satellite users will confirm or deny any impact of the event on their asset(s).
The advantage of this approach is that a global network can exist to detect threats against anyone's spacecraft. This may allow STWIAR to become globally useful as with the Global Positioning Satellite System. The cost to deploy and maintain such a system could be borne by many nations. The disadvantage to this deployment option is the large number of satellites that is required, especially to provide for a picket fence for laser attack. This is due to the small diffractive spreading of laser beams.
Communications
Timely receipt of event reports is effectiveness of the STW/AR sensor. In the event that there is not a ground station in view, it may be desirable for event reports to be relayed by NASA's Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) or a similar system. The message header for an event report would contain the identifier of the originating STW/AR sensor.
Data Flow
If STWIAR is an add-in or strap-on payload, event reports may be transmitted over the host spacecraft's communications link to the satellite user. Autonomous STWIAR sensors pass the event report directly to a ground station or via a relay to a ground station. The event report is then passed to Air Force operators for further processing and dissemination.
The location of the event relative to the earth's surface involves a straight forward coordinate translation of the spacecraft's coordinates. The nature of the event is determined by the power or intensity of the electromagnetic pulse and the duration of the event. After consultation with the satellite user of the targeted spacecraft, an analysis is made to determine whether the event was intended to degrade or destroy any systems or whether the event was a probe or a tracking event. Using information about the event such as frequency, pulse format, power, intensity, and angle of arrival, analysis will determine the probable device type and location and whether the event was hostile or an inadvertent friendly intrusion.
Design Issues
The false alarm rate must be very low. If STWIAR is to become a mainstream operational space system, the reliability of its event reports must be very accurate. That is, a report of an attack or jamming must be true and all such events, directed at a particular spacecraft, must be detected. Knowledge of the normal, RF or laser background is also necessary.
The earth background presents a large spatial and temporal signal variation to the sensor. Discriminating a hostile signal from this background can be difficult. Techniques to do so rely on the unique nature of the signals to be detected such as pulse repetition frequency, polarization, or coherence length. New threats will certainly evolve over the life of the host spacecraft with characteristics outside of the original threat envelope. Therefore, future STWIAR systems must be re-programmable.
The RF background consists of terrestrial and astrophysical sources. Terrestrial sources include natural sources like lightning and man-made sources, such as ground and air radars and communications systems. Astrophysical sources include galaxies, the cosmic background, stars, and our sun. The total spectral density (Watts I m2 / Mhz) for all of these sources combined is shown in Table 2 .
Spacecrajl discharging. Spacecraft electrical discharge is spacecraft altitudes.
As an example, some satellites routinely see 1,500 volts creating broadband RF emissions that can damage an RF threat warning sensor or trigger a false alarm. also a serious source of false alarms and is a problem at all Host EMI. The range of possible host spacecraft presents a variety of electromagnetic interference environments which an RF threat warning sensor must be able to adapt to.
Host Configuration. The various host spacecraft present different antenna locations and frequencies. This increases Table 2 . RF Source Spectral Densities.
the difficulty in designing a generic STWIAR sensor which may ride aboard any possible host without minimal redesign.
RF Sensor. Antennas for the RF sensor, comprising an interferometer, will be multi-arm spirals and dipoles. These antenna types have diameters of 3 to 4 inches and can be mounted anywhere on the spacecraft outer surface as long as they have an unobstructed view of the earth, and can be connected to the RF receiver. Electronic shielding of the antennas from the host's transmitters can be physical ,and in the form of notch filters. Maximizing the lengths (of the baselines of the interferometer will increase the resallution and thereby, decrease reliance upon spacecraft motion to locate an RF source within a given error circle.
Borrowing from the electronic warfare community, the probable RF receivers are similar in design to those in use for earth-based W threat detection missions.
A superheterodyne receiver provides high sensitivity over a wide range of frequencies and excellent frequency selectivity. The superheterodyne mixes the input arid the local oscillator signals producing output signals at the sum and difference frequencies. Only the difference signal is passed on and amplified. The stability of the local oscillator frequency is a major concern to the accuracy of the frequency measurements.
A superheterodyne receiver can scan the RF spectrum by sweeping the local oscillator frequency. Another method of monitoring a wide spectrum is to couple a superheterodyne with a wideband receiver which locates a signal and tells the superheterodyne where to tune.
An instantaneous frequency measurement receiver (IFM) can only process one signal at a time. If multiple, simultaneous, input pulses impinge upon the receiver, the result may be an erroneous frequency measurement. An IFM splits an input signal and imparts a phase delay I~O one of these signals, which is linearly proportional to the input's frequency. To measure the input frequency, the receiver measures this phase delay using phase correlators. The IFM covers a wide bandwidth with moderately high sensitivity and fine frequency response on short pulses. This approach allows the sensor to be made compact.
A micro-scan receiver is a scanning superheterodyne receiver which changes the local oscillator frequency in a sawtooth pattern. A disadvantage of this type of receiver it the slow scanrate which results in low sensitivity in a frequency rich environment. Compressive receivers (CR), a type of micro-scan receiver, are wideband receivers with fine frequency resolution which can process simultaneous signals. CRs have high probability of intercept and simultaneous signal capability.
The CR uses a linearly swept local oscillator, which is combined with the input RF signal to yield a linear frequency modulated (FM), or chirp signal. The chirp is sent through a dispersive delay line (DDL) whose time delay is the inverse of the FM pulse. The output of the DDL is a pulse compressed in time. The net result is that the input signal is converted to a short pulse. The position of the pulse, in time, is an indication of the frequency of the input signal. The width of the pulse is proportional to the intermediate frequency bandwidth.
Primary design issues are weight, power, size, reliability, and cost. A goal of the STWIAR technology program is to reduce the weight and power requirements of the threat warning sensors through innovative technology techniques and component miniaturization. The RF receiver must continuously monitor the typical satellite communications and radar frequencies. The ability to geo-locate over this spectrum is probably the largest mass and power driver.
Laser Sensor Architecture. At this time, the laser sensor design is much less solidified than for the RF sensor. As the launch date is not until 2005, this poses no problem. Sandia National Laboratory is looking at all possible laser sensor architectures to come up with the best solution which meets or exceeds the performance requirements, while minimizing weight and power, and demonstrating technology innovation.
The current effort is looking at several design issues:
(1) Determine performance threshold and goals, (2) Evaluate optical concepts for maximum optimal performance, A fast acting shutter may be incorporated into the sensor to protect the detector from damaging laser radiation. Linear arrays are expected to be the baseline detector. A slit coupled to a toric lens will focus the laser beam onto the array and serve as a one dimensional location sensor. The position of the first order peak on the linear array will pinpoint the angle of arrival of the laser beam in one angular coordinate axis.
PASSIVE DIRECTION FINDING AND GEOLOCATION
There are two general techniques to determine the angle of arrival of an RF signal, amplitude direction finding, and phase interferometry.
Amplitude DF
Rotating a highly directive antenna, until the received signal is maximized, is a simple, mechanical method of direction finding. This method has a low probability of intercept because the detection of multiple signals is difficult, while the sensor is scanning for the maximum strength of a single signal.
An alternative approach is to use four quadrant detectors and compare the amplitude of the four antenna signals. The best choice of antenna for this application is a spiral antenna which has a Gaussian gain function. Four crystal video, or superheterodyne, receivers monitor each antenna. The ratio of the received powers is proportional to the angle of arrival. A lookup table of power ratios quickly gives the angle of arrival in one plane. Channel imbalance is the primary error source of a four spiral antenna system. Other errors arise from variations in beamwidth, variations in crossover angle, and electrical noise.
Phase Interferometry
A linear array can only provide an estimate of one component of the source's location vector, which is the plane of the array. Therefore, a two dimensional array is necessary to pinpoint the RF source from space by determining the azimuth and elevation angles. A three dimensional array will also provide an estimate of the wavelength.
When the total length of the array is greater than half a wavelength, phase ambiguities may result. Limiting the acceptance angle, so that the maximum phase difference between extreme elements of the array is less than 2x, will eliminate these ambiguities. The accuracy of interferometers range from 0.5 degrees (very expensive) to a few degrees.
Generally, the wider the array, the more accurate is the direction to the source.
RADIO FREQUENCY SENSOR DESIGN
The radar receiver to support the upcoming STWIAR RF experiment consists of a wideband radar warning receiver (RWR), which continuously scans each of the RF sub-bands and, when detecting a signal, tunes a narrow band superheterodyne receiver to the signal for data gathering and processing. The RF sensor payload will be radiation cooled.
The frequency of a detected signal is rapidly measured by an Instantaneous Frequency Measurement (IFM) receiver utilizing a delay discriminator line (DDL). The DDL converts the detected signal to a chirped output signal with a phase delay proportional to the input signal's frequency.
The RWR has two principle modes of operation, auto and enhanced. In the baseline auto mode the broadband receiver quickly scans the RF sub-bands while the narrow band receiver scans the sub-bands more slowly in eight Mhz steps. In the enhanced mode, a snapshot recording capability is activated, whereby short samples of a detected RF signal are recorded and stored for later downlink.
The experimental data to be measured and downlinked include:
(1) The phase difference between each antenna pair of the interferometer array,
In this technique, the received signal's phase difference as sensed by the elements of an array indicates the angle of arrival. If the phase of the received signal at each antenna, and the location of each antenna is known, then the direction to the RF source can be calculated. 
LASER SENSOR DESIGN
Sandia National Laboratory's STW/AR efforts have focused on developing and evaluating conceptual designs for a next generation laser threat sensor. This sensor is intended to provide STWIAR capabilities to a wide variety of host satellites. Since the laser sensor is intended for nearly universal deployment, the design goals place emphasis not only on sensor performance but on miniaturization, low mass, and low power consumption. Previous Sandia National Laboratory designed systems, although suitable for specific missions, have been too large and massive for universal deployment.
The mission of the laser sensor is to detect, locate, and characterize laser threats directed, primarily, at optical sensors. A laser sensor must be sensitive to energy levels many orders of magnitude lower than those which can damage. On the other hand, this same sensor must, ideally, be able to survive any damaging as well.
Logically, initial efforts were aimed at defining laser sensor requirements. The growth in requirements can negaitively impact the physical size and power consumption of the sensor. Therefore, diligence must be continually exercised to keep the requirements to only those which are truly necessary.
Damage studies on optical wavelength laser sensors, and optical sensor theory, provide a basic understanding of the performance capabilities and sensitivities for any particular choice of sensor. Figure 4 [l] illustrates laboratory determined sensor damage levels. At long exposure times the damage thresholds are measured in terms of watts per square centimeter deposited on the detector surface.
In order to conserve mass and power usage, it was hoped that a single, uncooled detector would suffice for the entire waveband of interest. While a cooled detector could greatly enhance infrared detection performance, the cost in both power and weight would be unacceptable. The sensitivities of available uncooled detector arrays, as well as, the need for increased sensitivity at visible wavelengths, requires the use of a dual band system.
The Sandia laser sensor will use an integrating detector sampled at, most likely, a kilohertz. One detector will provide information on both pulsed and CW signals but two detector types are required to cover the infrared to visible waveband.
Infrared detectors respond to changes in material properties of the detector such as temperature, resistance, or polarization. Therefore, to detect continuous signals a means of converting that signal to a pulsed format is necessary, such as a chopper wheel. Sandia's design uses a proprietary electro-mechanical system to detect both pulsed and CW signals from each integrating, AC-responding detector.
The brightness of the earth's background from both reflected sunlight and infrared emission presents a problem in achieving extremely low detection levels. The use of electrical and optical background suppression techniques is required and is being investigated.
Both one-and two-dimensional arrays were considered. There is potentially more information available with twodimensional arrays, however, there is a weight and power penalty from the larger number of pixels and the associated signal processing. The current sensor design uses a set of two or three linear arrays to detect and geo-locate both pulsed and CW sources.
Both a visible and an infrared set of arrays is needed to cover the spectral range. Each set will operate independently, but their outputs are processed in a nearly identical fashion. Each array locates a laser threat on the earth in one linear dimension. Theoretically, only two arrays are needed for a complete geo-location with the third array providing additional solutions andlor accuracy. Prior experience with orbiting laser sensors indicates that a high-sensitivity system needs the third array if low false alarm rates are to be achieved. Therefore, in spite of the added weight and power, the final detection system will likely use a three-array approach.
EXPERIMENT PLAN
The experiment objectives for the STWIAR RF experiment are :
(1) Demonstrate detection, identification, location, and characterization of intentional and unintentional RF signals.
(2) Demonstrate innovative, light weight, low power, miniature RF sensor technologies. Since this is only one satellite ground control station, special attention is being given to designing efficient data handling.
The experiment plan includes two types of events. The first is to detect friendly ground-based satellite tracking radars.
The second event type is detection of RF sources of opportunity.
The radar tracking event experiment will occur in cooperation with friendly radar sites, such as, Ascension Island, Haystack, and Kwajalein.
As MightySat I1 spacecraft passes within the field of view of these radars it will attempt to detect the radar performing its normal acquisition and tracking function, measure RF pulse characteristics and geo-locate the source.
The RF interference event experiment will involve various RF sources, directing broadband RF energy at MightySat I1 spacecraft to determine the performance of the S T W I A R RF payload on board. 
